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Abstract: A primary reason for implementing a carbon or greenhouse gas tax is to reduce emissions, 
but in recent years there has been increased interest in a carbon tax’s revenue potential. This revenue 
could be used for federal deficit reduction, to help finance tax reform, support new spending priorities 
such as infrastructure spending, offset the burden of the tax on households, or other purposes. With an 
environmental goal to reduce emissions to very low levels, programs that become dependent on the revenue 
may come up short when and if carbon revenue begins to decline. To date, the revenue potential of a carbon 
tax has not been studied in detail. This study focuses on how much carbon tax revenue can be collected and 
whether there is a carbon “Laffer Curve” relationship, with a point where revenue begins to decline. We 
employ the MIT U.S. Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model, a dynamic computable general equilibrium 
model for the U.S. economy, for the numerical investigation of this question. We consider scenarios with 
different carbon prices and emissions reductions goals to explore how they may affect whether and at what 
tax rate revenues peak. We find that a sufficiently high tax rate would induce a revenue peak between now 
and 2050. For the scenarios we study, however, we find that carbon tax revenue is a dependable source of 
revenue to finance federal fiscal initiatives over a thirty-year period at the minimum. We also explore how 
the cost of low-carbon technology and existing energy policies interact with tax rates and revenues. Our 
results indicate that lower costs of abatement technology make emissions more responsive to the tax rate, 
and removing regulations on renewables and personal transportation results in more carbon tax revenues. 
Our results also show that either lowering technology costs or removing existing policies would reduce the 
welfare cost of a carbon policy with specific reduction goals, with a larger offsetting gain from eliminating 
distortions associated with existing policies. 
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1. Introduction
The United States is living through a period of consid-
erable climate policy uncertainty. While the Trump Ad-
ministration announced that the United States would 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement and has moved for-
ward with plans to roll back the Clean Power Plan and 
other climate-related regulations, the general public ap-
pears increasingly concerned about the issue. According 
to one recent poll, voters feel the Trump Administration 
should not remove specific regulations to combat climate 
change.1 Another poll focused specifically on Trump vot-
ers finds that nearly two-thirds of these voters support 
regulating or taxing greenhouse gas emissions.2
Meanwhile, the Republican agenda calls a major overhaul 
of income taxes including rate cuts and the Trump Ad-
ministration has discussed a major infrastructure spend-
ing package. A major obstacle to any of these initiatives 
is their potential impact on the federal budget deficit. 
Recently, a group associated with the Republican orient-
ed American Action Forum proposed a “20/20” plan to 
combine a carbon tax starting at $20 a ton and growing 
at an annual 4 percent real rate with a cut in the corpo-
rate income tax rate to 20 percent. Coming from another 
direction, a group of senior Republican leaders includ-
ing former Secretaries of State George Shultz and James 
Baker, former Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson 
as well as former heads of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers, Martin Feldstein and N. Gregory Mankiw, have 
proposed a $40 per ton carbon tax rising over time with 
revenues rebated to U.S. families through a monthly car-
bon dividend.3 
Of course, a primary reason for implementing a carbon 
or greenhouse gas tax is to reduce emissions (Metcalf, 
2009). The policy initiatives above, however, speak to 
the increased interest in a carbon tax’s revenue potential. 
The revenue could be used for federal deficit reduction, 
to help finance tax reform, support new spending pri-
orities such as infrastructure spending or, as proposed 
above, simply returned to households. Carbon revenue 
used for new initiatives might net out some funding for 
temporary transitional assistance to workers in indus-
1  Quinnipiac poll taken March 30 – April 3, 2017 available at 
https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2449. 
2  Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., Cutler, 
M., & Rosenthal, S. (2017). Trump Voters & Global Warming. 
Yale University and George Mason University. New Haven, CT: 
Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, available at 
http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/trump-voters- 
global-warming/ (accessed on April 12, 2017). 
3  The American Action Forum 20/20 plan is described at  
https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/tax-reform-initiative-
group-briefing-book/. The tax and dividend plan is described at 
https://www.clcouncil.org/. 
tries particularly affected by the carbon tax or to address 
concerns about impacts on low-income households. But 
even after some set-aside, there likely would be consider-
able revenue for other uses in the federal budget.
Given the environmental goal of ultimately reducing 
emissions to very low levels, programs that become de-
pendent on the revenue may face funding challenges 
when and if carbon revenue begins to decline. To date, 
the revenue potential of a carbon tax has not been stud-
ied in detail. This study focuses on how much carbon 
tax revenue can be collected and at what point the tax 
revenue peaks and starts to decline. In other words, we 
explore the carbon version of the “Laffer Curve” (Wanni-
ski, 1978) relationship that postulates a trade-off between 
the tax rate and revenue. We examine the gross revenue 
from the carbon tax alone, the net change in tax collec-
tion for the Federal tax system as a whole accounting 
for reduction in other taxes, and the impact on State tax 
collections. The net impact on tax collection takes into 
account changes in income and payroll tax revenue due 
to reduced economic activity in response to implementa-
tion of carbon taxes. Any legislation would face an eval-
uation of the revenue impacts by the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (JCT). Under budgeting rules that go back 
to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (PL 93-344), 
JCT was tasked to provide revenue estimates for all tax 
legislation; these estimates are the official estimates used 
for legislative purposes and in subsequent balanced bud-
get legislation and other budgetary control legislation.4 
As part of its revenue estimating process, the JCT only 
considers net revenue increases from a tax after taking 
account of a tax change’s impact on other taxes. For ex-
cise taxes, JCT assumes a set offset percentage to income 
and payroll taxes for each year of the present law base-
line.5 JCT does not consider impacts on state tax revenue, 
which we calculate endogenously in our model. While 
not part of the Federal offset calculation, this impact may 
be of interest to States.
We employ the MIT U.S. Regional Energy Policy (US-
REP) model (Rausch et al., 2010a), a dynamic comput-
able general equilibrium model for the U.S. economy, for 
4  JCT’s role in the budget process is described at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1174. 
Also see its description of its revenue estimating process at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4969. 
JCT’s revenue estimating procedure and revenue scoring are not CGE 
model outcomes. While the estimates assume a wide variety of behav-
ioral responses, they generally assume that the size of the economy 
(GNP) is unchanged. Among other things, this means that total labor 
supply, employment, and investment are held constant as described in 
JCT’s revenue estimating process document. Our offset estimates will 
differ from JCT’s estimates in part because of this assumption on GNP.
5  The rationale and procedure for the offset is described in Joint 
Committee on Taxation Staff (2011).
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the numerical investigation of the tax revenue questions. 
We consider scenarios with different carbon prices and 
emissions reductions goals to explore how they may af-
fect whether and at what tax rate revenues begin to de-
cline. We find that revenue peaks and begins to decline at 
the higher tax rates we consider. However, even in these 
scenarios, the revenue declines are relatively small, and 
thus we conclude that a carbon tax is likely a dependable 
source of revenue to finance federal fiscal initiatives over 
at least the thirty-year horizon of our study for policy tar-
gets that have been proposed by various groups.
When exploring how the cost of low-carbon technology 
and existing policies interact with tax rate and tax reve-
nues, our preliminary results suggest that a lower cost of 
abatement technology makes emissions more responsive 
to the tax rate and reduces the revenue potential for any 
given target emissions reduction. Removing regulations 
on renewables and personal transportation, on the other 
hand, results in more carbon tax revenues. Our results 
also show that either lower technology costs or removal 
of the existing policies would reduce the negative welfare 
impact of a carbon policy with specific reduction goals, 
with a larger offsetting gain from eliminating distortions 
associated with the existing policies. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the US-
REP model that we use for the analysis. We then discuss 
the various scenarios we consider in Section 3. In Section 
4 we present the results and draw some policy implica-
tions. We conclude with thoughts for further analysis. 
2. The Model
2.1 Data
The USREP model is built on an energy-economic data-
set of the U.S. economy, called IMPLAN (IMPLAN, 
2008). For the purpose of energy and environmental 
policy study, we improve the input-output dataset (Lin-
dall et al. 2006) at the state-level prepared by IMPLAN 
by replacing its energy accounts with physical energy 
quantities and energy prices from Energy Information 
Administration State Energy Data System (EIA-SEDS, 
2009) for the same benchmark year 2006. The final data-
set is rebalanced using constrained least-squares optimi-
zation techniques for a consistent representation of the 
economy (Rausch and Rutherford, 2008). Additional 
data sources are used to improve the model parameter-
ization (Table 1). 
We aggregate the dataset to 12 U.S. regions, 11 sectors, 
and 9 households grouped by annual income classes. The 
regional definition characterizes separate electricity in-
terconnects, and captures some of the diversity among 
states in consumption and production of energy. The 
509 commodities are aggregated to five energy sectors 
and six non-energy sectors. The energy sectors include 
coal (COL), natural gas (GAS), crude oil (CRU), refined 
oil (OIL) and electricity (ELE). The non-energy sectors 
include energy-intensive industries (EIS), agriculture 
(AGR), commercial transportation (TRN), personal 
transportation (HHTRN), services (SRV) and all other 
goods (OTH). Primary factors include labor, capital, and 
land, as well as depletable fossil fuels and wind and bio-
mass supply as renewable resources. Households across 
income classes differ in terms of income sources and ex-
penditure patterns. 
Our dataset permits calculation of existing tax rates com-
prised of sector and region-specific ad-valorem output 
taxes, payroll taxes and corporate income taxes. The data-
set has been augmented by incorporating regional tax 
data for 2006 (available at http://www.nber.org/taxsim) 
Table 1: uSREP data sources 
Data and Parameters Source
Social Accounting Matrices Minnesota IMPLAN Group (2008)
Physical energy flows and energy prices Energy Information Administration - State Energy Data System (EIA-SEDS, 2009)
Fossil fuel reserves and biomass supply U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 2009) 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE, 2009) 
Dyni (2006) 
Oakridge National Laboratories (2009)
High-resolution wind data National Renewable Eenrgy Laboratory - Wind Integration Datasets (NREL, 2010)
Non-CO2 GHG Inventories  
and endogenous costing
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2009) 
Hyman et al. (2002)
Marginal personal income tax rates NBER's TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993)
Trade elasticities The GTAP 7 Data Base (Narayana and Walmsley, 2008) and own calculation 
Own calculation
Energy demand and supply elasticities MIT EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2014)
Passenger vehicle transportation U.S. Department of Transportation (2009)
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from the NBER TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 
1993) to represent marginal personal income tax rates 
by region and income class. Using marginal tax rates 
is important both in terms of better representing the 
deadweight loss associated with a progressive income 
tax structure and for estimating the impacts on reve-
nue from these sources when activity levels (tax base for 
each) are affected by the carbon tax. We approximate the 
U.S. progressive income tax with an income-specific lin-
ear income tax by setting a marginal tax rate for each in-
come class to match marginal tax rates from the TAXSIM 
model and then set the intercept so that average tax rates 
match IMPLAN data at the regional/income class level. 
For projecting forward, we adjusted the intercept so that 
the effective revenue government raised through taxes 
matches AEO 2017 projections (EIA, 2017).
Energy supply is regionalized by incorporating data for 
regional crude oil and natural gas reserves from U.S. De-
partment of Energy (DOE, 2009), coal reserves estimated 
by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 2009), and shale 
oil (Dyni, 2006). Our approach to characterizing wind 
resource and incorporating electricity generation from 
wind in the model based on data from the National Re-
newable Energy Laboratory (NREL, 2010) is described in 
detail in Rausch and Karplus (2014). We derive region-
al supply curves for biomass from data from Oak Ridge 
National Laboratories (2009) that describes quantity and 
price pairs for biomass supply for each state.
2.2 Model Overview
Our modeling framework draws on a multi-commodity, 
multi-region, multi-household numerical general equi-
librium model of the U.S. economy. The model used a 
recursive-dynamic solution approach implying that eco-
nomic agents have myopic expectations, basing their de-
cisions on current period information.
In each industry, gross output is produced using inputs 
of labor, capital, energy and intermediate material goods. 
Primary energy production sectors (crude oil, shale oil, 
coal, natural gas) use depletable natural resources (crude 
oil, coal, and natural gas). The model also includes pri-
mary energy production sectors that use renewable, 
non-depletable resources (wind and biomass). Agricul-
ture and biomass production uses land. 
We employ constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) func-
tions to characterize how production technologies respond 
to changes in the relative prices of inputs. All industries are 
characterized by constant returns to scale (CRS). Limited 
depletable and renewable resource inputs to primary en-
ergy production sectors give these sectors upward sloping 
supply, even though the basic production structure is CRS.
Consumption, labor supply, and savings result from the 
decisions of representative households by income class 
in each region maximizing utility subject to a budget 
constraint. The IMPLAN data include capital income by 
region and income class, but the dataset does not source 
the ownership of depletable and renewable resources. 
Hence, regional resource endowments are distributed 
to households in proportion to capital income. Given 
input prices gross of taxes, firms maximize profits sub-
ject to technology constraints. Firms operate in perfectly 
competitive markets and maximize their profit by selling 
their products at a price equal to marginal costs. In each 
region, a single government entity approximates govern-
ment activities at all levels—federal, state, and local. Gov-
ernment consumption is paid for with income from tax 
revenue net of inter-institutional transfers (e.g., transfers 
to households). To ensure a comparable welfare compar-
ison across policy scenarios, government consumption is 
held at the constant level as in the baseline.
Advanced energy supply options are specified as “back-
stop” technologies that enter endogenously when they 
become economically competitive with existing tech-
nologies. Competitiveness of advanced technologies 
depends on the endogenously determined prices for all 
inputs, as those prices depend on depletion of resources, 
energy and environmental policies, and other forces driv-
ing economic growth. We adopt a top-down approach of 
representing technologies following Paltsev et al. (2005) 
where each technology can be described through a nest-
ed CES function. Table 2 summarizes the advanced 
technology options. Eight technologies produce perfect 
substitutes for electricity. Three technologies produce 
perfect substitutes for conventional fossil fuels. Three 
technologies provide alternative personal vehicle trans-
portation options. 
We adopt a putty-clay approach where a fraction of previ-
ously installed capital becomes nonmalleable and frozen 
into the prevailing techniques of production. Vintaged 
production in a given industry that uses non-malleable 
capital is subject to a fixed-coefficient transformation 
process in which the factor intensities of capital, labor, 
intermediate inputs and energy by fuel type are set to 
be identical to those that prevailed in the period when 
the capital was installed. Each of the sector-specific vin-
tages is tracked through time as a separate capital stock. 
This formulation captures the stickiness in substitution 
among production inputs when relative prices change. In 
other words, it means that the model exhibits different 
short-run and long-run response, with a more elastic re-
sponse to energy price increases in the long-run driven 
by the gradual replacement of less energy efficient capital 
with more efficient capital over time. 
Our framework incorporates a detailed representation 
of private passenger vehicle transport that allows projec-
tions of vehicle-miles traveled (VMT), fleet stock turn-
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over, and fuel price-induced investment in fuel efficiency. 
This allows studies of policies such as the U.S. Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards that target im-
provements in vehicle fuel efficiency as the framework 
differentiates between newly purchased and pre-existing 
vehicle stocks in each period. Changes in overall vehi-
cle-miles traveled as well as the fuel use and GHG emis-
sions of new and pre-existing vehicles are tracked. More 
detailed description and discussion of the model features 
are available in Rausch et al. (2010a,b).
USREP is formulated as a mixed complementarity prob-
lem (MCP) (Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 1995), coded 
in MPSGE (Rutherford, 1999), and solved by PATH solv-
er (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995).
3. Scenarios
We updated the USREP baseline since the most recent 
published work (Rausch and Reilly, 2015), calibrating 
labor productivity to match GDP forecasts to the An-
nual Energy Outlook (AEO) of the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA, 2017). The update includes incor-
porating the CAFE standards for personal vehicle trans-
portation into the baseline. Also represented in the base-
line scenario are regional renewable portfolio standards 
(RPS) to reflect the various RPS programs in different 
states based on EIA AEO assessment (EIA, 2017). 
We designed a set of carbon policy scenarios that repre-
sent a variety of tax rates and emissions targets that have 
received policy attention. These include (1) a $40@4% 
case with a carbon tax starting at $40 per ton of CO2 and 
rising at 4 percent real from 2020 to 2050; and (2) a 26/80 
Reduction case where a carbon tax is set to achieve 26 
percent reduction in emissions relative to 2005 by 2025 
as proposed in the U.S. Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution (INDC) under the Paris Agreement, and 
an 80 percent reduction in emissions by 2050, an aspi-
rational target analyzed in the United States Mid-Cen-
tury Strategy (MCS) for Deep Decarbonization building 
on the 2009 G8 meeting in L’Aquila that called for an 80 
percent reduction in emissions by developed countries 
by 2050.6 The emission targets in the intermediate years 
are linearly interpolated.
To further explore how tax rate and tax revenue are af-
fected by the cost of low-carbon technology and exist-
ing policies, we develop two additional scenarios, both 
achieving the same carbon emission reductions as in 
the 26/80 Reduction case. The 26/80 Low Cost scenario 
assumes a lower cost of low-carbon technologies, as the 
cost of these backstop technologies are highly uncertain 
(IEA, 2015) but could fall in the future with technolo-
6  The Mid-Century Strategy (MCS) for Deep Decarbonization  
found it is technically feasible to achieve an 80% greenhouse gas  
reduction below 2005 levels by 2050 in the U.S. 
(https://unfccc.int/files/focus/long-term_strategies/application/pdf/
mid_century_strategy_report-final_red.pdf). 
The L’Aquila Chairs Summary is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15572_en.pdf.
Table 2: uSREP advanced technologies 
Technology Description
Electricity
Biomass generation Convert biomass into electricity
Wind / Solar Intermittent wind/solar resources
Wind / gas backup Intermittent wind generation with natural gas backup
Wind / biomass backup Intermittent wind generation with biomass backup
Advanced gas Natural gas combined cycle (NGCC)
Advanced gas / CCS NGCC that captures 90% or more of the carbon emissions produced in electricity generation
Advanced coal / CCS Advanced coal that captures 90% or more of the carbon emissions produced in electricity generation
Advanced nuclear Next generation of nuclear power plants incorporating estimated costs of building new nuclear power 
plants in the future
Fossil Fuel
Coal gasification Converts coal into natural gas
Shale oil Converts shale oil into crude oil
Biomass liquids Converts biomass into refined oil
Personal Transport
PHEV Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles
CNG Compressed natural gas vehicles
EV Electric vehicles
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gy advance. For our purposes of focusing on tax reve-
nue collection, it does not matter which electricity op-
tion has a lower cost. For simplicity, we lowered the cost 
markup of advanced nuclear generation by 20%. We also 
assumed for this case further breakthroughs in electric 
vehicles (EV) for personal transportation, lowering their 
cost by 20%. The 26/80 No CAFE/RPS scenario removes 
the existing CAFE and RPS targets from the baseline, 
consistent with the new Administration’s rolling back of 
Obama era climate policies. We also model the elimina-
tion of state-level RPS programs in order to measure the 
welfare cost of these sector-specific strategies.
To maintain revenue neutrality, an endogenously cal-
culated portion of the carbon tax revenue is reserved to 
replace any reduction in other tax collections brought 
about by the carbon tax and the rest of the revenue is 
distributed lump-sum to the households. In the current 
study, we assume that the revenue returned to the house-
holds is not taxed.7 If the revenue were used to cut other 
taxes, that would reduce their distortionary effects and 
hence also have impacts on overall revenue. These effects 
are second-order—here our interest is in providing a 
first-order estimate of gross and net carbon tax revenue 
and how it changes with the tax rate. Table 3 provides a 
summary of these scenarios.
7   Making the carbon tax distribution taxable would enhance the 
progressivity of the rebate given the U.S. progressive tax rate structure 
and would decrease the revenue loss in other taxes.
4. Results
4.1 Emissions Reductions and Carbon Prices
The 26/80 Reduction, 26/80 Low Cost and 26/80 No 
CAFE/RPS by design cut the emissions by the same 
amount from the baseline. Figure 1 compares the emis-
sions reductions in the $40@4% and 26/80 Reduction cas-
es relative to the 2005 level of 5982 MMTCO2. Both cases 
result in about the same reductions by 2025. By 2050, the 
$40@4% case would cut 40% emissions relative to 2005, 
half the emission reductions achieved in the 26/80 cases.
Figure 2 shows taxes in each of the cases. The $40@4% 
case starts with a $40/tCO2 in 2020 growing to $130/
tCO2 in 2050. The carbon tax rates needed to achieve the 
various 26/80 scenarios are endogenously determined. 
The 26/80 Reduction case requires 17% emission reduc-
tions by 2020 relative to 2005 and so starts with a carbon 
price of $32/tCO2 in 2020 that rises to $55/tCO2 in 2025 
and then to $520/tCO2 by 2050. In the 26/80 Low Cost 
case, lowering the markup on advanced nuclear and EV 
makes both backstop technologies more economically 
competitive. It reduces the cost of decarbonization in the 
electricity and personal transportation sector beginning 
in 2030 when these technologies first become competi-
tive at these lower costs. As a result, the needed tax rate in 
Figure 1: Emissions reductions (% change from the baseline)
Table 3: Scenarios 
Scenario Label Policy Description
Baseline Existing CAFE & Renewable targets
$40@4% Carbon tax starts at $40 in 2020, rising 4% annually
26/80 Reduction Carbon tax to reduce emissions 17% by 2020, 26% by 2025, and 80% by 2050, relative to 2005
26/80 Low Cost 26/80 Reduction + low cost electric vehicles + low cost low-carbon electricity
26/80 No CAFE/RPS 26/80 Reduction + removing CAFE & Renewable targets
Figure 2: Carbon prices (2016$/tCO2) 
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2030 is about $10 lower than in the 26/80 Reduction case, 
with this difference growing to about $100 less in 2050. 
The 26/80 No CAFE/RPS case has higher carbon prices 
than the 26/80 Reduction case. Removing CAFE in per-
sonal transportation and RPS in the electricity sector 
requires higher carbon prices through 2045, starting at 
$64/tCO2 in 2020 ($32 above 26/80 Reduction) and rising 
to $126/tCO2 by 2025 ($71 above 26/80 Reduction) with 
the difference diminishing after that and disappearing by 
2050. Tax rates are higher because, in effect, we have re-
placed an implicit tax imposed through the regulations 
with an explicit tax for the electricity and transportation 
sector. The RPS and CAFE programs are still in effect un-
der the high carbon prices in the 26/80 Reduction case.8 
That is, the requirements under the regulations would 
only be partially met given the high tax rates required 
to achieve an 80 percent reduction by 2050. Completely 
removing RPS and CAFE would drive up carbon prices. 
Higher carbon prices, on the other hand, provide incen-
tive to adopt fuel-efficient technologies for all sectors. 
The accumulation of more efficient capital stock in turn 
reduces carbon prices in the later periods for the same 
economy-wide emissions reduction. These two forces 
work in opposite direction, and by pure conincidence, 
bring the carbon prices in the two cases together by 2050. 
4.2 Electricity Generation and Prices
A carbon price changes the cost competitiveness among 
generation technologies, making fossil based genera-
tion relatively more expensive than low-carbon or ze-
ro-carbon technologies, thus creating the incentive to 
8  We discuss the welfare implication in Section 4.5.
deploy more low-carbon and zero-carbon technologies 
to minimize the cost of electricity production. Figure 3 
shows the changes in generation profile. At a lower level 
of carbon prices in the $40@4% case, coal-fired genera-
tion is displaced with gas-fired and nuclear. In the 26/80 
Reduction case, advanced nuclear enters in 2030 and ex-
pands quickly to substitute for conventional fossil-fired 
generation. With a lower markup on advanced nuclear in 
26/80 Low Cost case, more advanced nuclear is deployed. 
Removing RPS programs eliminates the implicit subsidy 
to renewables and implicit tax on non-renewable gen-
eration sources. Compared to the 26/80 Reduction case, 
generation from biomass, wind, and solar is displaced 
by fossil and nuclear in early periods before 2030 when 
advanced nuclear becomes commercially available. Post 
2030, advanced nuclear penetrates at a much faster rate. 
By 2050, generation from advanced nuclear is one-third 
higher in the 26/80 No CAFE/RPS scenario than in the 
26/80 Reduction case. With different cost assumptions, or 
limits on nuclear expansion because of safety concerns, 
a different mix of technologies would likely exist, with a 
different cost structure (see Figure 4).
Figure 5 shows how policy affects the cost of generation. 
The difference between the $40@4% and 26/80 Reduc-
tion case are in line with the difference in carbon prices. 
Among the 26/80 cases, the case with lower cost of ad-
vanced nuclear brings down the cost of generation by 23 
percent starting in 2030 when advanced nuclear begins 
to penetrate. Moreover, lower carbon prices in the 26/80 
Low Cost case further reduce the cost increase from the 
baseline. Removing RPS starts to show an immediate 
impact starting in 2020, with only a 3% increase in gen-
eration cost in 2020 in comparison to a 4% increase in 
Figure 3: Electricity generation (change from the baseline, TWh) 
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the 26/80 Reduction scenario. As time goes on, the gen-
eration cost increase in the 26/80 No CAFE/RPS case is 
shown to be less than both the 26/80 Reduction and 26/80 
Low Cost case, despite higher carbon prices through-
out the horizon. This result indicates that a carbon tax 
is a more cost-effective way to reduce emissions than 
through technology mandates such as RPS requirements.
4.3 Tax Revenue
As noted at the outset, a carbon tax provides revenue that 
could finance any number of government initiatives. But 
policy makers might be hesitant to turn to carbon tax-
es if they felt that having a stringent emission reduction 
target would lead to revenue shortfalls quickly. We inves-
tigate that issue now, looking first at carbon tax revenue 
alone (ignoring changes in other tax revenues). Overall, 
we find that carbon tax revenue does not peak in the 
$40@4% scenario over our 2020–2050 time horizon, and, 
while revenue exhibits peaks in the other scenarios, the 
decline of the revenue after the peak is relatively small in 
all cases (see Figure 6). 
The $40@4% case raises the least revenue of all the cases 
(except in the 2020 when the 26/80 Low Cost and 26/80 
Reduction require relatively low carbon prices). The 26/80 
Low Cost case raises slightly more than the $40@4% case 
and not as much revenue as the 26/80 Reduction case. 
Conversely, the 26/80 No CAFE/RPS case raises signifi-
cantly more revenue than the 26/80 Reduction case, es-
pecially in earlier years (i.e., through 2035). The 26/80 
Reduction and the 26/80 No CAFE/RPS cases show a 
revenue peak. Revenue peaks in 2040 for the 26/80 Re-
duction case, and in 2035 for the 26/80 No CAFE/RPS 
case. The decline in revenue from its peak values in the 
26/80 Reduction case is 2% by the end of our study hori-
zon (2050). The greatest decline (18%) is in the 26/80 No 
CAFE/RPS but even with that decline revenue in 2050 is 
as high or higher than any of the other cases.
Overall the results show, first, the possibility of a peak 
in carbon tax revenue with very stringent climate poli-
cy targets; second, relatively modest declines in revenue 
when there is a peak, at least through the 2050 horizon 
of our study, and, third, technology cost and existing reg-
ulatory programs can strongly affect revenues as well as 
the timing of the peak. 
We next turn our attention to net revenue raised from 
the carbon tax, taking into account reductions in revenue 
from other taxes. Such reductions come about because a 
carbon tax raises the cost of production for firms, low-
ers final demand, and demand for factors of production 
(e.g., capital and labor). This, in turn, leads to an erosion 
of payroll and income tax revenue. For budget scoring 
purposes, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) em-
ploys an offset rule as described above that reduces the 
amount of an excise tax like a carbon tax that may be 
used for budgetary purposes.9 Rather than use the JCT 
offset rule, USREP endogenously calculates changes in 
all sources of income and demands and provides con-
sistent estimates of the changes in tax revenue from all 
sources. As we show below, our calculated offset is close 
to the JCT offset at low to moderate carbon tax rates. At 
higher rates, the official offset percentage appears to be 
lower than the actual offset.10 
Figure 4 shows the changes in tax revenue by source 
as well as net Federal tax revenue in all four cases. The 
$40@4% case raises net Federal tax revenue from about 
$145 billion in 2020 growing to about $370 billion by 
2050.11 Compared to the $40@4% case, the net Federal 
tax revenue stream does not increase monotonically and 
peaks in 2040 for the 26/80 Reduction and the 26/80 No 
CAFE/RPS scenarios and in 2045 in the 26/80 Low Cost 
scenario. As the carbon tax rate grows over time, the rev-
enue change suggests a Laffer Curve relation between the 
carbon tax rate and the resulting revenue. Similar to the 
analysis of the carbon tax revenue in isolation, net tax 
revenue exhibits a similar Laffer Curve pattern and the 
shape of the curve varies depending on the technology 
cost assumption and existing policies.
The USREP model has a single government entity repre-
senting both Federal, State, and Local governments col-
lecting personal and corporate income tax, payroll tax 
and other taxes. To break out the Federal tax revenue, we 
applied shares calculated based on Federal, State and Lo-
cal government revenue for each tax category.12 Our cal-
culations are based on historic tax collections, where 80% 
of personal income tax, 87% of corporate income tax and 
100% of payroll tax are allocated to Federal government. 
For all other taxes, 84% of the revenue is collected by State 
and Local governments. To calculate an offset, we add up 
the change in Federal revenue from personal and corpo-
rate income tax, payroll tax and excise tax. We then di-
vide the total revenue from these taxes by the carbon tax 
9   The annual offset percentage is between 25 and 26 percent 
for 2016–2026. See JCX-7-16, New Income And Payroll Tax Offsets 
To Changes In Excise Tax Revenues For 2016-2026, available at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4869
10  As noted above, one factor driving differences in offset rates is 
the constant GNP assumption in JCT’s revenue estimating procedures. 
Below we use the JCT offset measure to calculate how much revenue 
can be rebated to households since the JCT rule would determine how 
much of the carbon tax revenue may be used for rebates.
11  The $40@4% scenario results in monotonically increasing carbon 
tax and net Federal tax revenues without running into a peak. The 
26/80 Low Cost scenario does not have a peak in carbon tax revenue, 
but the net Federal tax revenue peaks in 2040.
12  Federal, State and Local government revenue by source is available 
at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/revenue-government-level
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Figure 5: Cost of generation (percent change from the baseline)
Figure 6: Carbon tax revenue in isolation (Billion 2016$)
Figure 4: Advanced nuclear penetration (TWh). Note: in the $40@4% scenario, advanced nuclear generation appears only in 2050 
and produces 5 TWh.
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revenue, as shown in the last column of Table 4.13 Com-
pared to the 26/80 Reduction case, the 26/80 Low Cost case 
requires a smaller carbon tax and so the offsetting losses 
from personal and corporate income, payroll and other 
taxes are smaller. Notably, the offsetting losses in the 26/80 
No CAFE/RPS are considerably smaller in general than 
the 26/80 Reduction case. Despite higher carbon taxes that 
increase the cost of production, cheaper electricity prices 
due to the removal of RPS provides a countervailing effect 
that reduces the impact on production as well as tax col-
lected from production. This shows an important interac-
tion between pre-existing policies and the carbon tax.
The tax offset, represented by a percentage of carbon tax 
revenue that is set aside to replace lost federal tax revenue 
13  Only Federal revenue is provided in Table 4. Note that state tax 
revenue is affected as well because carbon tax is collected at a Federal 
level, but state tax collections are reduced for the similar reasons that 
affect federal non-carbon taxes. 
from income and payroll taxes, ranges from 19–27% in the 
$40@4% case, and 20–52% in the 26/80 cases. In contrast 
to our estimates, the Joint Committee on Taxation uses a 
tax offset of 25 percent (see Footnote 9). The changes in the 
tax offsets in different scenarios are roughly proportional to 
the changes in economic activities and welfare (discussed 
below) relative to the Baseline. These changes occur be-
cause a carbon tax raises the cost of production for firms, 
lowers final demand, and demand for factors of produc-
tion, which leads to an erosion of non-carbon tax revenue. 
Removing distortions associated with regulations (RPS and 
CAFE) brings the offsets closer to the JCT estimate. 
4.4 Revenue Rebate
The Climate Leadership Council that proposed the $40 
tax proposed distributing revenue directly to individu-
als on an equal per capita basis.14 We can estimate a car-
14  Described at https://www.clcouncil.org/
Table 4: Federal revenue offset calculated based on model results (Billion 2016$) 
Personal 
Income Tax
Corporate 
Income Tax Payroll Tax Excise Tax Carbon Tax
Net Federal 
Revenue Offset
$4
0@
4%
2020 -26 -7 -14 -2 194 145 -25%
2025 -27 -8 -18 -3 216 160 -26%
2030 -30 -9 -22 -3 238 173 -27%
2035 -30 -9 -23 -3 281 215 -24%
2040 -32 -11 -27 -4 327 253 -23%
2045 -35 -12 -31 -5 388 306 -21%
2050 -36 -12 -32 -5 454 369 -19%
26
/8
0 
Re
du
ct
io
n
2020 -20 -6 -11 -2 156 118 -25%
2025 -30 -9 -20 -3 238 176 -26%
2030 -48 -14 -33 -5 343 243 -29%
2035 -75 -22 -57 -8 528 366 -31%
2040 -83 -26 -73 -10 611 418 -32%
2045 -96 -28 -89 -12 603 377 -37%
2050 -136 -31 -126 -18 600 289 -52%
26
/8
0 
Lo
w 
Co
st
2020 -20 -6 -12 -2 154 115 -25%
2025 -29 -9 -20 -3 240 179 -25%
2030 -37 -10 -28 -4 305 225 -26%
2035 -45 -12 -39 -5 393 292 -26%
2040 -36 -11 -39 -4 411 321 -22%
2045 -60 -15 -61 -8 476 333 -30%
2050 -95 -19 -104 -13 481 251 -48%
26
/8
0 
No
 C
AF
E/
RP
S 2020 -37 -10 -19 -2 318 249 -21%
2025 -72 -21 -38 -5 549 413 -25%
2030 -76 -22 -46 -7 579 429 -26%
2035 -97 -25 -64 -8 738 544 -26%
2040 -87 -19 -58 -6 731 561 -23%
2045 -80 -8 -39 -3 641 511 -20%
2050 -111 1 -41 -3 602 447 -26%
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bon dividend that every U.S. person would be able to get 
from the government by dividing the net Federal tax rev-
enue (from Table 4) by the U.S. population projected by 
U.S. Census Bureau (2014). The results are presented in 
Table 5. The carbon dividend (expressed in 2016$) grows 
from $343–746 in 2020 to $630–1123 in 2050 in different 
scenarios. This would be an annual dividend of the order 
of $2000–$4000 for a family of four.
4.5 Welfare
We next turn to the welfare implications of our various 
scenarios. We report change in welfare as equivalent 
variation which takes into account the change in con-
sumption and leisure.15 Figure 7 shows the changes in 
welfare relative to the Baseline scenario (recall that CAFE 
and RPS are included in the Baseline). Welfare impacts in 
the $40@4% case are modest. This is not surprising giv-
en the relatively lower tax rate assumed in this case than 
carbon prices in the 26/80 scenarios. Welfare impacts 
in the 26/80 Reduction case can run as high as 2.3% in 
2050 when deep decarbonization is required. If the cost 
of green technologies comes down, welfare costs are low-
er by 0.5% relative to the 26/80 Reduction case in 2050. 
Finally, removing CAFE and RPS improves the welfare 
impact relative to the 26/80 Reduction scenario with im-
15  The changes in consumption relative to Baseline are mostly 
negative, but they display a similar relative pattern as the changes in 
equivalent variation based on consumption and leisure. 
mediate short-term gains from removing the RPS and 
larger long-term gains from removing both CAFE and 
RPS. This result strongly illustrates the economic benefit 
of allowing the market, when faced with a carbon tax, to 
choose the least cost low carbon technologies rather than 
relying on mandated technology policies. 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the carbon prices of the 
26/80 Reduction and the 26/80 No CAFE/RPS case con-
verge toward later periods. The welfare impacts of the two 
cases, however, are quite different. Although the carbon 
prices partially mute the RPS and CAFE requirements, 
there is substantial gain in welfare from removing those 
regulations. The gain is sufficiently large that it results in 
welfare improvement relative to the baseline for most of 
the model years. This suggests that the cost of RPS and 
CAFE programs are even greater than the carbon tax that 
are required to achieve 80% reduction by 2050.
5. Conclusion
This study focuses on how much carbon tax revenue can 
be collected and whether there is a carbon “Laffer Curve” 
relationship, where tax revenue peaks and begins to de-
cline beyond a certain carbon tax rate. We employ the 
MIT U.S. Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model, a dy-
namic computable general equilibrium model for the U.S. 
economy, for the numerical investigation of this ques-
tion. We consider scenarios with different carbon prices 
and emissions reductions goals to explore how that may 
Table 5: Revenue rebate (per person/year, Billion 2016$
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
$40@4% 435 462 483 580 664 787 927
26/80 Reduction 352 508 677 988 1,100 969 727
26/80 Low Cost 343 516 627 789 845 854 630
26/80 No CAFE/RPS 746 1,189 1,194 1,469 1,475 1,312 1,123
Figure 7: Welfare Change from the Baseline Scenario. 
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affect whether and at what tax rate revenues peak. We 
find that a sufficiently high tax rate would induce a rev-
enue peak. For the scenarios we study, however, we find 
that carbon tax revenue is a dependable source of reve-
nue to finance federal fiscal initiatives over a thirty-year 
period at the minimum because, even with a peak, the 
revenue decline is modest. When exploring how the cost 
of low-carbon technology and existing policies interact 
with tax rate and tax revenues, our results suggest that 
lower cost of abatement technology make emissions 
more responsive to the tax rate, and removing regula-
tions on renewables and personal transportation results 
in more carbon tax revenues. Our results also show that 
either lowering technology cost or removing existing 
policies would reduce the negative welfare impact of a 
carbon policy with specific reduction goals, with a larger 
offsetting gain from eliminating distortions associated 
with existing policies such as RPS and CAFE. Finally, the 
welfare results point to the economic benefit of allowing 
the market, when faced with a carbon tax, to choose the 
least-cost low-carbon technologies rather than relying on 
mandates to achieve specific technology goals.
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